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Abstract 
This article offers a re-examination of the concept of Erastianism as an explanatory tool in 
discussions of church and state. It focuses in particular on three texts – by Pierre du Moulin, 
Thomas Cobbet and John Milton – that took up the question of the nature of civil power in 
the sphere of religion. Based on this, the article argues that the term ‘Erastianism’ obscures 
the complexity and nuance of arguments about religious politics in the civil war period. It 
concludes by suggesting that we should instead consider these debates as contributions to 
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In early modern England, a key source of political tension lay in the relationship of church 
and state. Approached from the perspective of the history of political thought, the 
Reformation was an ‘act of state’ which redrew the boundaries of power between sovereigns 
and subjects, and blurred the line that apparently separated political authority and individual 
conscience. Religious dissent manifested itself as political opposition, and it is now a matter 
of broad agreement that religion shaped the political character of the English civil war. [1] 
This has, in turn, influenced how historians have come to understand larger questions 
concerning the development of the modern state, constitutionalism and religious toleration. 
The English revolution continues to be studied as a seminal chapter in this broader story, 
owing to the fact that the link between religion and politics permeates the abundant range of 
sources that illustrate the arguments of principle that emerged in the conflict, and define its 
legacies. [2] 
One key development in recent historiography has been to characterize the religious dynamic 
of the civil war as ‘Erastian’ – a term used to describe a process and ethos that granted the 
state complete control over religion. [3] This article takes a contrasting approach, and argues 
that positions on the relationship of church and state were framed partly by the political 
circumstances of local context, and partly by an evolving discourse of sovereignty over 
religion. If we agree that the sixteen-forties saw the wholesale collapse of the supremacy of 
the regal and episcopal church order, then it is possible to approach the religious politics of 
the Interregnum period as part of an effort at constitutional reconstruction. [4] This search for 
foundations was driven by the need to calm divisions between various partisan factions, to 
establish the legitimacy of the various permutations of the Cromwellian regime, and finally to 
address the reality of its decline. [5] Whether or not the politics of religion – and the political 
theory that it generated – was dominated by an Erastian logic of state supremacy over 
religion is the question that this article seeks to explore. This is not to deny that some 
contemporaries expressed a genuine desire to bring religion under the control of the civil 
power, rather to suggest that the religious politics of the Interregnum did not fit neatly into a 
uniform theory. 
The article begins with a brief historiographical discussion of the Erastian interpretation of 
the politics of religious conflict, and then proceeds to a consideration of the issues raised in 
key controversies over church and state in the sixteen-forties. Having established this context, 
it will turn first to a consideration of the English translation of Erastus's Explicatio, and then 
to an examination of texts – by Lewis du Moulin, Thomas Cobbet and John Milton – that are 
devoted to the question of the religious power of civil magistrates. The selection of these 
writers is determined by the fact that they made direct contributions to key issues in 
Interregnum political ecclesiology: Du Moulin addressed the issue of the religious authority 
of a de facto power, while Cobbet sought to defend the coercive tendencies of Massachusetts 
puritanism by cloaking it in the authority of the civil magistrate. Finally, Milton ended a 
nearly decade-long silence in English (that is, vernacular) political writing in a contribution to 
the debate over the re-establishment of a national church, or what he called a ‘special 
conformation’ of church and state. 
Based on this material, the article offers two major arguments. First, it suggests that Erastus's 
own position was based on a view of ecclesiastical power that blurred rather than clarified the 
line between civil and ecclesiastical sovereignty. And second, it argues that writers who 
explored the question of civil power in the sphere of religion did not always embrace the 
logic of religion as subordinate to a strictly secular civil power, and arrived instead at a range 
of positions, some of which explicitly constrained the power of civil magistrates in the sphere 
of religion. To describe the politics of religion as ‘Erastian’ runs the risk of replacing the 
complexity of these debates on civil power with an overly-schematized interpretation, which 
assumes that the religious politics of the English revolution reflects the same tensions over 
clericalism and sovereignty that furnish the core dynamic of the transition between medieval 
and modern constitutionalism. [6] 
Analysing the relationship of church and state is a project common to a number of branches 
of historiography. A conspicuous feature of recent scholarship is that the relationship of 
religion and politics is presented in adversarial terms. In part, this perspective builds on 
studies of the medieval roots of modern constitutionalism, which lie in the contest over legal 
jurisdiction that took place between the Church of Rome and the kingdoms in which it was 
domiciled, as well as between advocates of papal and conciliarist views within the Roman 
church itself. [7] As Brian Tierney has argued, ‘Language that was first used in connection 
with the church was later applied to the state’. [8] In a similar vein, John Sheehan has noted 
that a prominent feature of this language of the state was a concept of sovereignty that was 
employed, in part, to combat claims that the clergy constituted a separate estate, and gained 
from this status a measure of autonomy from the law. [9] One of the major statements against 
independent clerical jurisdiction was the Defensor Pacis (1324) of Marsilius of Padua; in 
particular, Marsilius rejected the idea that the clergy enjoyed a monopoly on coercive power. 
As he noted, ‘Coercive power does not, then, belong to any priest or bishop whomsoever; 
rather, they as much as everyone else should be subject in this to secular judges’. [10] That 
the secular authority was the sole legitimate holder of coercive power is one of the marks of 
the state in its ‘modern’ posture, and hence a seminal account of the development of the state 
stems from the medieval debate between priests and kings, and follows a trajectory defined 
by the emergence of an entirely secular politics. [11] 
While some scholars have turned to Marsilius as a guide to the conceptual aspects of the 
problem of church and state, a far more dominant name in this line of inquiry is that of 
Erastus. [12] Born Thomas Lüber (1524–83), ‘Erastus’ is the name we now associate with the 
Swiss theologian and physician, whose principal works figured in ecclesiastical disputes 
among Calvinists in Heidelberg. The term Erastian appears in a small number of 
controversial works published in England during the sixteen-forties, and enjoyed something 
of a revival in discussions of disestablishment among the clerical elites of the Victorian and 
Edwardian periods. Here, clergymen returned to the history of the English Reformation with 
the aim of constructing a coherent theory of state control over religion. [13] Perhaps the most 
notable figure in this generation is John Neville Figgis, whose work ensured that the term 
‘Erastianism’ was fixed in the historiography to denote the supremacy of the civil power over 
the church. [14] As Figgis explained, Erastus did not seek to ‘magnify the state’, but rather to 
assert that it held ‘all coercive authority’ and that it ‘must support one religion and tolerate no 
other’. [15] However, since the appearance of Figgis's essay, the term Erastianism has been 
used to refer to an eclectic range of concepts and powers, including: obedience to a 
magistrate with jure divino power; [16] the ‘claim of secular power to control belief’; [17] a 
theory that defined the ‘basis’ rather than the ‘form of church government’; [18] as a defence 
of purely ‘civil control of the church’; [19] and as a justification for the ‘scriptural basis of 
civil power’. [20] While some have argued that Erastianism implied that ‘all religious truth 
was at the mercy of the civil power’, others have maintained that the term denotes the ‘broad 
control of most aspects of religious affairs by the secular power’. [21] 
A more consistent handling of concepts is evident in recent studies of the religious character 
of the English civil war. Here, Erastianism functions chiefly as a tool for understanding the 
tension between regal and clerical authority. This analysis owes much to the seminal work of 
William Lamont, and in particular his vision of the godly magistrate charged with the ethical 
mission of checking clerical power. [22] For example, Alan Orr has argued that a major 
contributor to perceptions of misrule during the reign of Charles I was the Laudian attempt to 
seize control of the church. In so doing they trespassed upon the sovereignty of the crown, 
and violated a purely civil view of ecclesiastical supremacy, lodged with king and parliament. 
[23] Similarly, Jeffrey Collins has argued that the ‘religious war waged by the Long 
Parliament was at heart a fight to preserve England's Erastian church settlement against the 
first overtly clericalist Protestant monarch since the Reformation’. [24] For Collins, the 
church settlement of the Reformation was ‘Erastian’ rather than ‘Calvinist’, and hence the 
events of the sixteen-forties were defined as a ‘struggle to protect the ecclesiological legacy 
of the Reformation’. [25] Finally, Alan Cromartie has argued that the ‘resurgent clericalism’ 
of the Laudians amounted to ‘anti-Erastianism’; the solution to this ‘constitutional problem’ 
was extensive church reform, which meant a return to the Erastian principles that guided the 
Reformation. [26] The defeat of Laud (and the king) represented the victory of ‘legal values’, 
and the restoration of a medieval interpretation of the constitution as a purely secular and 
legal entity. [27] 
While these accounts represent a welcome departure from narrowly theological explanations 
of religious conflict, it is also the case that a neat division between law and clericalism tends 
to obscure the nuance of contemporary debate. Take, for example, discussions of church 
government that dominated the deliberations of the Westminster Assembly, the precise 
context in which the label ‘Erastian’ was applied to defenders of some form of established 
religion. [28] George Gillespie, one of the dominant Presbyterians in the assembly, emerged 
as one of its most prolific polemical voices. In his dialogue between a ‘civilian’ and a 
‘divine’, he mapped out the contrasting positions of the main parties. The civilian argued, 
based on the evidence of the Hebrew commonwealth, that there was ‘no such distinction as 
Church and State’, whereas the divine maintained that civil and sacred powers were ‘formally 
different’. [29] Similarly, the recorder of the assembly noted that civil and ecclesiastical 
power ‘each act in their own sphere, and not one encroach upon the other’. [30] Thomas 
Coleman, a noted Hebraist, argued that power over church and state was a function of 
sovereignty, and that ‘the governments Civil and Ecclesiastical, are in subject matter, clearly 
distinct’; when parliament was concerned with matters of war, it was a military court, while 
in respect of religion ‘it is an Ecclesiastical Court’. [31] For Coleman, parliament had 
jurisdiction in both spheres, while Gillespie's reply to this passage marked out a separation of 
jurisdictions, whereby ‘Discipline and Government are Ecclesiastical, and subjectively 
different from Civil Government’. [32] In speaking of spheres, the nature and purposes of 
government, and in weighing the difference between civil and ecclesiastical power, these 
writers were concerned not with a static concept of the state, but rather with a fluid notion of 
sovereignty. 
This tendency is clearly illustrated in Gillespie's major contribution to the debate, which 
explored ‘the differences between the nature’ of civil and ecclesiastical power. [33] As he 
explained, in a passage that returned to his exchange with Coleman on the nature of 
sovereignty, ‘The powers being distinct in their nature and causes, the effects must needs be 
distinct, which flow from the actuating and putting in execution of the powers’. [34] 
Concerning the precise relationship at issue in the debate, Gillespie noted that ‘The Civil and 
Ecclesiastical power, if we speak properly, are not collateral. They have no footing upon the 
same ground’. [35] In short, civil and ecclesiastical power bore no relation to one another, 
both in terms of their nature and their use; this, in turn, explained why specific powers should 
be confined to their own spheres. Civil power was concerned with ‘matters of Peace, War, 
Justice, the Kings matters, and the Country matters’, whereas ecclesiastical power included 
‘things pertaining to God … as they are distinct from Civil matters’. In his description of civil 
power, Gillespie lists some of the conventional ‘marks’ of sovereignty that formed part of the 
cluster of powers wielded by the supreme magistrate, and which reflected the standard theory 
of the nature of political authority in the seventeenth century. [36] Most importantly, while he 
was careful to delineate the powers of civil sovereignty, he was also clear that there were 
aspects of religion that did not fall within this remit. 
Much the same distinction between the nature of civil and ecclesiastical power forms a 
central theme in the debate between adherents of Congregationalism (sometimes called 
Independents) and their various opponents. [37] It has been suggested that this group readily 
expressed ‘deference’ to the religious authority of the ‘secular state’, but this characterization 
is arguably more appropriate to Independents writing in the period after 1649. [38] In the 
sixteen-forties, writers in this group placed implicit constraints on civil authority by positing 
a separation of civil and religious spheres. For example, the authors of the Apologeticall 
Narration noted that ‘ecclesiastical proceedings’ could be ‘put in execution … without the 
Magistrates interposing power of another nature’; elsewhere, they state that the magistrate 
‘doe but assist and back’ the sentences of the church. [39] This was because the government 
of the church was dissolved, and so it was an open question as to the form of ecclesiastical 
power that would be enacted in the ‘constitution and government that is yet to come’. [40] 
Here, the suggestion was that government was a form of transient custom, a sentiment echoed 
by Francis Rous, who argued that magistracy was an ‘Ordinance of man’, and as such 
confined to politique uses of religion. For example, it might perform a civil function through 
encouraging ‘good morall conversation’, yet this did not alter the fact that the power of the 
magistrate was ‘but a civil thing’, directed to the maintenance of the ‘publique peace’ without 
‘Cognizance of differences in religion’. [41] 
A concentrated series of responses to these positions came from William Prynne. Like many 
critics, Prynne portrayed Independency as an affront to sovereignty; gathered in ‘private 
conventicles’ and ‘corporations’, its adherents spurned the binding jurisdiction of magistracy 
and the national church. If the Independents were permitted to frame their own ecclesiology, 
he argued, ‘they must have a like liberty to … erect what civill forme of government they 
please; to set up a new Independent Republicke’. [42] Instead, church government had to 
complement the form of the state that surrounded it, and the authority to fashion 
‘Ecclesiastical constitutions’ resided with the ‘whole Nationall Parliament, Synod, Kingdom’. 
[43] It has been suggested that Prynne was less than precise about the ‘location’ of 
ecclesiastical sovereignty, and this three-fold division of power would seem to bear this out. 
[44] What does emerge, however, is that Prynne did not assert that the state had complete 
control over religion, for he noted that kings and parliaments exercised jurisdiction over 
adiaphora, or ‘things indifferent’, that is, ‘over all ecclesiasticall matters, which are not 
positively of divine institution and injunction’. [45] In that sense, church government is a 
conflation of custom and specific cues taken from the scripture: a ‘National Councell’, 
following a process of ‘serious debate’, establishes a form of government ‘as they conceive to 
be the most Consonant to Gods Word, to the Laws, Government under which they live, and 
manners of their people, and then settle them by a general law’. [46] 
Prynne's vision of ecclesiastical power is informed by notions of contractualism and consent, 
embodied in the terms of the Solemn League and Covenant. This was a position he developed 
at some length in 1645, in the context of a discussion of the manner in which Independency 
undermined ‘Laws and common Rule’ of obedience. [47] He argued that the stability and 
unity of political society depended on the principle that the ‘major voyce binds the lesser 
number’. Adopting a conjectural approach to the development of public power, he noted that 
people ‘stript of all their natural, civil or Ecclesiatical relations, are of equall authority’; 
however, as political society developed so too did a kind of corporatism, which contained a 
structure of power that erased this original and solitary equality. The same condition applied 
in the ‘Nationall Church’, where all were subject to ‘just rules … even in point of 
conscience’. [48] The source of these rules was the union of ‘the whole power and authority 
of both united Kingdoms’, and while this might appear to be a ‘new jurisdiction’, it in fact 
replicated a pattern of sovereignty whose roots lay in the Saxon Heptarchy. Given this unified 
structure of power, Independent congregations were merely ‘Privados’ which violated the 
binding maxim of ‘Salus populi, being Suprema lex’. [49] To admit a Congregationalist 
pattern, therefore, was to deny the principle of ‘common consent’ and to give way to an 
arbitrary power. Here, Prynne turned to book III of Aristotle's Politics to illustrate the 
political wisdom whereby good laws served as a check on individual passions and interests. 
[50] 
In spite of Prynne's prolific defences of the concept of Christian magistracy, the question of 
sovereignty over religion formed a central theme in the debates that took place during the 
three years of settlement, rebellion and negotiation which followed the parliamentary 
ordinance for the establishment of Presbyterian government in March 1646. [51] For their 
part, the Scots resented the apparent constraints which the ordinance placed on church courts, 
and opened negotiations with the king in the hope that authority over discipline could be 
lodged in the hands of elders. [52] This led some to argue that a Presbyterian settlement 
would enhance the ‘bounds’ between the church and ‘civil power’. [53] Others suggested that 
the solution might lie in a ‘mixt Government of Bishops and Presbyters’, itself modelled on 
the Jewish Sanhedrin, which dealt with ‘the chiefe causes of the Commonwealth as well as 
Religion’. [54] However, Independents continued to maintain that civil magistracy over the 
church ‘confounded’ jurisdictions that were ‘plainly divided’, while their opponents replied 
that ecclesiastical jurisdiction ‘still remaineth in the imperiall Crown … as the ancient Law of 
this Land’. [55] For John Geree, the key to the whole problem was the fact that sovereignty 
was divided between ‘two supremacies acting in the same Kingdome’ which ‘cannot be 
without clashing & confusion, & continual occasion of broils’. [56] What was true of the 
sixteen-forties would be true of the decade that followed. 
The translation of Erastus's work – which first appeared in England in 1589 – was undertaken 
by Clement Barksdale, a clergyman who remained a supporter of the established church 
during the sixteen-forties and fifties, and who also published the translated works of Hugo 
Grotius and Peter Cunaeus. [57] These texts, in turn, formed part of a broader ‘revival’ of 
interest in the civil and religious customs of the ancient Hebrews, whose sacred texts were 
studied for the light they shed on how to regulate the relationship between religion and 
politics. [58] Reference to Hebraic sources permeated debates on church government in both 
the Jacobean and Caroline contexts, and figures as diverse in their political allegiances as 
William Laud and John Selden examined such precedents as the Jewish Sanhedrin, a body 
which combined civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. [59] It was this line of enquiry that led 
writers back to Erastus, whose text offered a historical discussion of the use of coercive 
power in the Jewish and early Christian contexts. Indeed, as Erastus admitted in the preface 
to the work, the original text (written sixteen years earlier) was intended as an intervention in 
a local controversy, sparked by an ‘Excommunicatory feaver’. This prompted him to return to 
the scripture, in order to discover what was ‘consonant or dissonant with received opinion’, 
and in particular Erastus found himself considering the ‘Jewish Republick and Church’. [60] 
From this example, it was clear that there was no precedent for ‘two divers Judicatories’; 
rather, the exercise of ecclesiastical discipline was committed to ‘one Magistrate’, and he 
argued that this magisterial power should be restored in the same posture as it was ‘of old’. 
[61] 
Like so many contributions to debates on church government, Erastus's text presented an 
argument that was rooted in a historical narrative. In particular, his work sought to establish 
the continuity between Hebraic and Christian practices, and is based on the premise that a 
solution to religious discord lay in a revival of Jewish patterns of church government. This 
led him to examine how the Jews dealt with ‘unclean’ members of the Temple, such as those 
who refused to observe the Passover rituals. He portrayed ecclesiastical discipline as 
essentially moderate and tolerant, where the ‘Synedrium’ consisting of ‘Kings and Rulers’ 
declared and applied law over the Temple. [62] These practices were continued by Christ, 
who ‘came not into this world to destroy the Law, but to fulfil and perfit the same’. The early 
church, whose existence was threatened by persecution, survived because it preserved the 
character of the ‘Jewish magistracy and Senate’. Reworking the language of Matthew 
XVIII:17 (‘tell it to the church, but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an 
heathen man and a publican’), Erastus noted that Christ himself ordered that the form of 
Jewish magistracy should continue: ‘Wherefore he commanded them to tell the Synedrium 
before they went to the Heathen Magistrate’. [63] Hence, while Christ was alive, the 
Sanhedrin still ruled, and Erastus noted that the Romans largely left the Jews ‘to use their 
own laws in matters belonging to Religion’. This led to a separation of powers, whereby the 
Sanhedrin ruled over religion, but in ‘politick matters’ the Romans took ‘all or most part’. 
[64] 
From this point Erastus turned to consider the historical character of the apostolic church, in 
which the ‘Ecclesiastick Senate’ of the Jews continued to function. It emerges that this phase 
of the narrative is concerned with the gradual rise of clerical power: the apostles themselves 
dealt with ‘binding and loosing’, but over time these practices degenerated and became 
corrupted by traditions ‘invented and feigned by men’. [65] That the once pure and legitimate 
rituals and practices of the church were gradually supplanted by human custom was a 
mainstay of Protestant ecclesiology, and so Erastus was following a well-worn path when he 
noted that excommunication was, like purgatory and the intercession of saints, a ‘publick 
custom received by all: neither came it ever in their mind to inquire whether it was a thing 
agreeing to scriptures or no’. The attack on ‘received wisdom’ was also a central tenet of 
humanism, and hence the utility of the Hebraic example was that it offered a return, as Luther 
put it, to the pure spring of the one true faith. [66] 
It is this impulse that led Erastus, in the final three sections of the work, to consider the 
question of magistracy over the church in his own time. He argues that the religious powers 
of the Christian magistrate should be modelled on the Jewish commonwealth, to which God 
himself granted a form of constitution; given this, he asks, ‘Do we thinke that we can 
constitute a better form of Church and Common-wealth?’ To illustrate the point he offers a 
genealogy of the kings of Judah, and shows that at each point in their descent from Moses, 
they exercised supremacy as both priests and judges. This power, in turn, comes down to all 
those Christian magistrates who are prepared to acknowledge that the scripture and examples 
of the ancient church take precedence over local custom. From this it follows that magistrates 
‘received power to constitute religion according to the precept of the holy Scriptures, and to 
dispose of its Offices and Ministers’. [67] It emerges, then, that Erastus did not make a clear 
case for the supremacy of the civil power over religion, simply because his preferred model 
of the Jewish church and commonwealth placed both powers in the hands of one magistracy. 
In other words, there was no purely civil power, but rather an elision or unity of church and 
state. [68] 
As Eric Nelson has argued, during the seventeenth century the Hebrew commonwealth was a 
rich source of ‘prudential maxims’ of politics. [69] While this is certainly true, it is also the 
case that writers employed a range of scriptural, juridical, classical and vernacular authorities; 
often these references jostled together in the confines of a single margin, as is evident in 
many of the works of writers such as William Prynne. [70] By contrast, Hebraism offered one 
route into the past, and one historical narrative on which to ground a theory of ecclesiastical 
authority. And so while Erastus's interest in the traditions of the Hebrews was certainly part 
of a wider trend, it was also strikingly narrow, particularly given that the problem of church 
and state (especially in England) raised complex questions about sovereignty and law. 
Moreover, since one distinguishing feature of early modern political debate was that concepts 
of power and authority were grounded in history, and since there were multiple ways in 
which the past could be narrated and thus politicized, then it follows that discussion of the 
relationship of civil power to religion was something that was explored with great breadth 
and complexity. [71] 
Given this, there were important ways in which Erastus's work was of little help in the 
discussion of religious politics in post-civil war England. For one thing, the political context 
of this period was framed by the disruption and eventual collapse of a constitutionally 
mandated supremacy of king over church; when, in January 1649, the Commons declared 
themselves the holders of ‘supreme power in this nation’, it remained to be seen how this 
power affected religion. [72] This meant that a plausible idea of sovereignty over religion 
would have to be agreed, and during the sixteen-fifties some writers approached the problem 
of sovereignty as a matter of reason of state, while others diluted civil power over religion by 
way of appeals for clerical independence, or for liberty of conscience. A further complicating 
factor is that the idea that the Jewish church and commonwealth offered a pattern worthy of 
imitation was not one which was universally endorsed; in fact, it was frequently rejected as a 
species of ‘transient law’. [73] In short, the problem of church and state in the sixteen-fifties 
fed into wider debates about sovereignty, toleration and liberty, yet these did not result in a 
wholesale endorsement of a civil supremacy over religion. 
By the time he published The Power of the Christian Magistrate in 1650, Louis du Moulin – 
a member of a noted family of exiled Huguenot controversialists – was already a seasoned 
writer, having produced texts on the need for a fully British church settlement, on 
sabbatarianism, and on ‘reasonable religion’. [74] The text of 1650 was one of four that he 
devoted to the question of what he called ‘Sovereign visible power’, and it was from the point 
of view of sovereignty that he approached the problem of power over the church. [75] In 
England, the power to govern the church was construed as a mark of sovereignty, and this 
native theory was wedded to the notion that sovereignty was unitary and indivisible, a 
position that we commonly associate with Jean Bodin. [76] For example, Du Moulin argued 
that where ‘two Supreame Magistrates’ wielded separate jurisdictions over ecclesiastical and 
civil actions, ‘such a State cannot be conceived without a great deal of confusion’. To admit 
rival sovereignties within a single state was to erect an ‘imperium in imperio’, a phrase that 
Du Moulin is certainly among the first to use to describe a problem that other writers, such as 
Henry Parker, styled as ‘regnum in regno’. [77] Du Moulin continued by noting that 
magisterial power extends ‘over all persons and causes’, and that there were ‘no persons 
distinct in jurisdiction’. This led him to consider political forms: the commonwealth 
amounted to a ‘Christian Visible Church’, which replicated the ‘Church and Kingdome of the 
Iews’ where no separation of civil and ecclesiastical could be found. [78] 
So while Du Moulin clearly sought to establish the supremacy of the magistrate over the 
clergy, he did not seek to model this arrangement exclusively on the commonwealth and 
church of the Hebrews. Instead, his position on the nature of civil power over religion was 
shaped very much by the circumstances in which he wrote, and chiefly the debate on the 
legitimacy of the Cromwellian regime as a de facto power. [79] One of the questions raised in 
this context was whether the constitutionally mandated regal supremacy over religion was 
translated to a regime that lacked a king. Du Moulin argued that: ‘Allegiance should be given 
him to whom the Imperiall Crowne of these realms shall descend, by which Imperiall 
Crowne, the Person is not principally meant, but the Realme’. [80] The most obvious 
reference to an ‘imperial crown’ in English constitutionalism is contained in the Act of 
Appeals – the foundational text in the English theory of regal supremacy. [81] In short, the 
historical example of the commonwealth of the Hebrews was of limited value in a context 
where the regal supremacy was enshrined in vernacular law. Rather, the challenge was to 
explain how this supremacy could legitimately function in the absence of a king. As Du 
Moulin explained: 
none will, I thinke, understand the lawfull Heirs and Successors of the Crowne, but him, or 
them that are actually in possession of the Gouerment; or which is all one, by the Crowne is 
meant the Supreame Judicature of the Kingdome for the time being, where the Crowne is 
placed, and to which the Jurisdiction belongeth, whatever Title the Supreame Power for the 
time being may have. [82] 
Simply put, legitimate authority lies with whomever holds the supreme judicial power, and it 
is clear that the location of this power can shift from time to time, and be designated by 
various titles. Writing in the context of the Engagement controversy, Du Moulin argued that 
sovereignty resided in ‘the realm’, rather than in the person of the sovereign. 
From this discussion of de factoism, Du Moulin turned to consider the problem of 
ecclesiastical supremacy more broadly. In what amounted to a definition of civil religion, he 
noted that the duty of the magistrate was to preserve the ‘peace and weale’ of the state; in 
order to preserve peace, it was necessary for the magistrate to ensure that the ‘Jus sacrum 
was comprised under the Jus publicum’. [83] The wisdom of ensuring that clerical power was 
subordinate to public right is illustrated by a number of historical examples: Theodosius II 
dismissed Nestorius as patriarch of Constantinople; Theodoric as viceroy of the Eastern 
Roman empire was active in preferring and banishing members of the high clergy; and even 
Pope Gregory I described himself as Theodoric's ‘unworthy servant’. The moral of these 
stories of clerical obeisance to magistrates was that ‘the Soveraigne power of the State’ 
exercised ‘the cognizance and ordering of Ecclesiastical causes and actions’. [84] Yet this 
was not a principle that was merely derived from a sample of historical anecdotes; instead, 
Du Moulin explains that the Code of Justinian demonstrated that magistrates held the ‘right 
and power’ to ‘make Lawes and Constitutions, of the same nature as the causes be’. [85] 
Taken together, these examples reveal that Du Moulin situates his discussion of civil power 
over religion not only in the history of the Hebrews, but also in the authoritative texts of 
Roman and post-Roman imperial jurisprudence. The ecclesiastical supremacy therefore 
becomes part of an approach to political rule that proceeds from the premise that sovereign 
power is established to promote peace and virtue. However, it is clear that the fount of this 
power is not human institutions and practices: Du Moulin refers to the ‘Grand Legislator’, 
and notes that sovereignty is itself ‘constituted by God, to the end that men might live godly, 
justly, soberly and peaceably’. This political wisdom is something that is even endorsed by 
pagan governors, and here Du Moulin – following Grotius – quotes Cicero: ‘religio est 
humanae societatis fundamentum’. [86] 
Having established that the principle of unitary sovereignty is a political maxim espoused by 
both Christian and pagan lawgivers, Du Moulin turns to the relationship of church and state. 
He begins with the observation that the magistrate is not ‘head of two things’, because in 
Christian commonwealths the commonwealth ‘is a Church, and every Church a 
commonwealth’; he adds that by ‘church’ he means those ‘that have as large and spacious 
extent of place, as the Common-wealth itself’. [87] Yet sovereignty was exercised not simply 
over territory, but also over individuals. Though it was ‘one in essence, [it] hath its several 
faculties and powers … tending to the ordering of the whole man … as well in things of the 
inward man, as the outward’. The sovereign is therefore the ‘primum movens’ and in a ‘State 
bounded, as England, by certain limits, no doubt if it be one State or Comon-wealth, it hath 
one Soveraigne Power … over all persons, actions, and causes’. [88] Taken as a whole, these 
sentences replicate the language of the Act of Appeals, that combined the supremacy of a 
sovereign power (‘imperium’) with a bounded territory (‘dominium’) inhabited by a body 
politic of spiritual and temporal people. Indeed, Du Moulin clearly regarded ecclesiastical 
sovereignty as part of the ‘imperium’, and to prevent a ‘confusion of empires’, it was 
necessary to ensure that ‘the Soveraigne Power in a State, hath an equall Jus imperii in 
Ecclesiasticall and civil matters’. [89] While Jeffrey Collins is correct to suggest that The 
Power did not represent the ‘culmination’ of Du Moulin's thinking on church and state, the 
text does reveal that the problem of sovereignty over religion could be understood as part of 
the historical experience of various political societies. 
Where Du Moulin's text was a contribution to a debate on how the ‘imperium’ continued to 
function even in de facto regimes, Thomas Cobbet's discussion of the religious powers of 
civil magistrates was shaped by narrower, local circumstances. Though we possess little 
biographical information, we do know that Cobbet's text was prompted by a complaint from a 
sect of Baptists, led by John Clark. [90] As Clark explained in his Ill newes from New 
England, he and his companions, having travelled to Massachusetts from Rhode Island, 
gathered at the house of a friend where there was a Baptist conventicle. As the charge against 
him stated, he did this while already under caution from the local magistrate for ‘professing 
against the institution of the church’, by which was meant the Congregationalist ecclesiology 
of New England. Clark was fined £20, and was to be whipped in the event of a default. [91] 
In the preface to Ill newes from New England, Clark addressed the Commons and likened his 
own persecution to that carried on during the sixteen-thirties by the Laudians. He continued 
with a discussion of the nature of civil power, which was confined to ensuring the ‘peace, 
liberty, and prosperity of a civil State, Nation, or Kingdom’. By contrast, in Massachusetts 
this power was illegitimately used against Baptists to ‘stop their mouthes’. [92] Employing an 
expansive concept of freedom of conscience, Clark argued that ‘the hidden part of man, to 
wit, his spirit, mind, and conscience … is indeed the most natural Lord and commander of the 
outward’. Where many writers offered a distinction whereby magistrates had cognisance over 
the ‘outward man’ – that is, in the public realm of law and civil causes – Clark maintained 
that since conscience was the seat of all actions of the body, then to restrain the body was 
also to restrain the conscience, which ‘cannot be lorded over, commanded, or forced’. [93] 
Yet this did not mean that Clark saw no role for what he called the ‘civil sword’, and so he 
exhorted the Commons to exercise the power with which they were ‘betrusted’ to ensure ‘the 
peace and settlement of these three Nations’, as well as ‘in any forreign part of the world’. By 
this he meant that the Commons should overrule the prosecutorial judgements of the local 
magistrates in Massachusetts, as part of their trust as ‘nursing fathers’ and servants of God. 
[94] 
Cobbet's reply to Clark's pamphlet proposed a basic modification to this position, and argued 
that it was part of the magistrate's duty to root out error and heresy from the church. He began 
with an extended gloss on the account – narrated in each of the four gospels – of Christ 
entering the Temple to drive out the merchants and money changers. However, in John II:15 
he is shown fashioning a whip; for Cobbet this action comes to symbolize the institution of a 
physical punishment, and the episode forms the basis of an argument for the necessity of 
discipline emanating from within the church but given force and reality by some external 
agent – the civil magistrate. As Cobbet explained: ‘What Christ did here immediately, as an 
act appertaining to his Soveraignty, to purge out Church corruptions, he now doth by his 
Vicegerents hands, mediately’. [95] In other words, magistrates have no intrinsic authority 
over religion that forms part of their broader power. Indeed, like many Congregationalists, 
Cobbet was working with a particular view of magisterial authority. [96] This is based on a 
distinction being drawn between civil and ecclesiastical realms and spheres; for example, 
with reference to restraint and punishment, Cobbet noted that ‘this is either Political, which is 
carried out in a civil way, and by political means; or Ecclesiasticall, which is carried out in a 
Church way, and by Ecclesiasticall means’. Here Cobbet seems to suggest that civil 
sovereignty does not extend over religion, simply because there is a difference in kind 
between civil and ecclesiastical punishments. This suggestion is confirmed in a passage 
where he posited a clearer distinction, arguing that ‘No Civil Authority whatsoever, nor 
persons thereto called, may, as persons in Civill Authority, curb or punish abuses in Religion, 
in any Ecclesiastical manner’. Picking up the key message of his gloss on John II:15, Cobbet 
declared that the power of the keys was never granted to civil commonwealths or kingdoms, 
but only to the church ‘as an Ecclesiastical Society’. [97] 
The logic of this argument is that the power of the magistrate is limited and constrained to the 
public realm. And even here, this power is not exercised according to the volition of the 
magistrate, because ‘it is the dutie … of the civil Rulers in a religious state, to restrain and 
punish corruptions and abuses in religion … breaking forth within their jurisdiction’. [98] 
What is to be noted here is the word ‘duty’ – the magistrate acts under an obligation to 
employ the civil sword to punish corruptions, yet the determination of what amounts to error 
and corruption is reserved to the church, and therefore the magistrate is merely a servant or 
enforcer. [99] As Cobbet remarked, there is a truth ‘professed and practised by Religious 
Commonwealths’ and ‘by the purer Churches within them’. [100] The role of the magistrate 
is therefore to ensure that this truth receives expression, but this does not extend to any 
determination of doctrine or discipline. In sum, Cobbet proposed two levels of authority in 
the civil and religious spheres, arguing that: 
we distinguish of Legislative power in matters of Religion. It is either Absolute, and merely 
Soveraign; and so onely God and Christ is law-giver unto his people … Or it is subordinate 
and subservient, and in a way of conformity and respect to the Laws of God already made by 
God, and so as men may be Kings and Judges. [101] 
Magistrates merely enforce laws that are preordained and which, by consequence, are not part 
of the sovereignty of the laws of realm or state. 
As we have seen, a basic tenet of the Erastian position was that the Hebrew commonwealth 
and church existed as a unity, with magistrates replicating the Mosaic power over both 
spheres. By contrast, Cobbet rejected any suggestion of mixed power, ‘partly Ecclesiasticall, 
and partly Civill’. Following the logic if not the letter of Du Moulin's argument, he claimed 
that this threatened the ‘confusion of the two powers’, a case of affairs that would not be 
permitted by ‘the God of order’. [102] Here again, Cobbet sought to draw a firm distinction 
between the spheres of divine and human law, and placed the latter in a position of 
subservience. The guiding assumptions of this position can be appreciated by quoting at some 
length: 
Laws about Religion … they are such which are no other but humane Civill Sanctions, and 
Ratifications, and Promulgations of Divine Laws, commanding, or forbidding what the Law 
or Word or God, either expressly, or by just consequence commandeth, or forbiddeth, so far 
as openly acted by the outward man, with suitable humane rewards or punishment annexed, 
binding Conscience onely so far as the Word it self allowing the Authority, and the Laws 
likewise made by the Authority binding the same. [103] 
Political sanctions over religion are therefore manifestations of divine law, and they do no 
more than declare and enforce what this law stipulates. There is no scope in this position for 
the customary or political laws of the state to be combined with divine law – this is the point 
underlying Cobbet's dismissal of the idea that civil and ecclesiastical power can be ‘mixed’ – 
for even in cases of conscience and the determination of punishments, the scripture 
constitutes the ultimate authority. Moreover, while there are officers to ‘watch over, govern, 
and censure Church Members’, the magistrate ‘is not reckoned among them’. [104] 
Cobbet's broader argument is therefore based on the premise that politics and religion are, as 
he expressed it, ‘within their own spheres’. However, he was also quick to point out that this 
relationship was not adversarial, but rather that ‘both polities may be reciprocally helpful to 
each other’. What is notable is that within this reciprocal relationship, the laws of the church 
apparently take precedence, with the state affirming divine law with civil discipline. As he 
explained: ‘The Civill polity ratifying the Churches cases, by Civill Laws and punishments, 
the Ecclesiasticall polity lending help to State and Commonwealth cases, by declaring the 
Laws and Rules of God’. [105] Notice that in both cases, the ‘laws and rules’ of the scripture 
form the basis for the legitimization of civil and ecclesiastical proceedings. This apparent 
theocracy has been recently described as ‘Godly republicanism’, and it is a particular feature 
of the workings of colonial politics in Massachusetts that even the most quotidian aspects of 
political life were informed by scriptural precept, which frequently led (most notably in the 
case of Roger Williams) to open intolerance and sharp conflicts between the common law 
and the political directives that could be derived from scripture. [106] 
This brings us back to Clark's case, which furnished an example of precisely the kind of 
reciprocal relationship that Cobbet described. As to Clark's argument that the expansive 
nature of conscience prohibited undue persecution, Cobbet replied that people were free to 
believe and to obey what was officially determined: ‘to Conscience rightly guided by the 
Lord, and according to his word, Civill Authority must give all incouraging Liberty’. [107] 
Once again, the civil magistrate has no role in determining the nature of religious truth, and in 
taking this stance Cobbet's view of magisterial authority contrasts with that of figures like 
Hobbes, who placed much emphasis on the role of the sovereign as interpreter of scripture. 
[108] Toleration, Cobbet concluded, has to be strictly limited, given that religion is among 
‘the very ligaments of a Christian State’ – to admit various religious practices is to threaten 
‘Confusion and Religion’, which is ‘hurtfull to Civill States’. [109] In short, Cobbet regarded 
the civil magistrate as being bound by a duty to defend a form of religion the theological and 
disciplinary elements of which were determined by ecclesiastical officers. 
The final text to be considered here also approaches the broader question of church and state 
from the perspective of a particular political context. John Milton's Treatise of Civil Power 
appeared in February 1659, during the opening weeks of Richard Cromwell's parliament, and 
following the appearance of the Savoy Declaration – a modification of the Presbyterian 
Westminster Confession. [110] The Treatise reflects Milton's disaffection with the ‘single 
rule’ of the Cromwellian protectorate, and his evident concern that the parliament – which he 
addressed as a ‘supream Councel’ – might grant undue latitude to either clergy or the sects. 
[111] This was Milton's first public writing in English in a decade, and it is framed by a wider 
debate about the framework of religious and civil government, a national church, tithes and 
religious toleration. [112] For example, in his Aphorisms, James Harrington linked liberty of 
conscience with a national religion, and a national religion to ‘an endowed clergy’. [113] 
Others were more sceptical: a ‘Wellwisher’ to England's peace noted that ‘this State’ would 
never be settled unless it was built upon civil and religious liberties. William Prynne attacked 
republicans and ‘sectaries’ as the usurpers of the commonwealth, while Henry Stubbe sought 
to return to first principles of government by examining a range of historic and sacred 
precedents for the peaceful distribution of civil and religious power. [114] 
In the preface to the Treatise, Milton noted that his chief concern was with ‘Christian liberty’, 
and continued by asking parliament to ‘defend still the Christian liberty which we enjoy [and] 
also to enlarge it’. [115] In contrast to the positions of advocates of civil religion – James 
Harrington chief among them – Milton argues against the use of civil coercion in the sphere 
of religion on the basis that this violates the principles of Christian liberty. [116] To compel 
people to adhere to a particular pattern of official religion, even for politique reasons of 
public peace, can never be justified, since it leads to violence and the suppression of 
conscience. In making his case, Milton returns to themes that defined his earliest 
contributions to debates on the politics of religion, namely in his anti-prelatical tracts of 1641 
and 1642. The first is an attack on ‘custom’, whereby the form of religion was determined by 
political considerations, and dominated by an all-powerful clergy; the second emphasized the 
role of reason and the ‘plain field’ of scripture as the true grounds of religion. [117] Milton 
rejected the idea that there should be a ‘special conformation’ between the government of the 
state and that of the church, noting that: ‘Tis not the common Law, nor the civil, but piety and 
justice, that are our foundresses; they stoop not, neither change colour for Aristocracy, 
democraty, or Monarchy’. [118] 
These arguments were originally developed in the context of the Long Parliament's bid to halt 
the religious reforms of the Caroline regime, and to restore the balance between religion and 
liberty that served as the chief justification of resistance to crown and bishops in the early 
sixteen-forties. [119] In the sixteen-fifties, Cromwell's support for an Independent pattern of 
ecclesiology went hand-in-hand with a pledge to preserve liberty of conscience, yet many 
churchmen argued – as did Thomas Cobbet – that the threat of heresy made it necessary for 
the state to impose firm constraints on belief and action. [120] For Milton, arguments of this 
type subjected religion to the ends of the state, whereas, 
it is the general consent of all sound protestant writers, that neither traditions, councels nor 
canons of any visible church, much less edicts of any magistrate or civil session, but the 
scripture only can be the final judge or rule in matters of religion, and that only in the 
conscience of every Christian himself. [121] 
The claim of sovereignty over individual conscience was part of the tradition of ‘civil 
papacie’, where clerics and scholars based their power in the interpretation of scriptures. 
Moreover, to define religious truth was also to define departures from it, and Milton decried 
the use of terms such as ‘blasphemy’, ‘heresy’ and ‘schism’ as a means of stigmatizing 
religious dissent, while serving as a prop for clerical power. [122] For example, Romans XIII 
(one of the proof texts of royal and clerical supremacy) was employed to ‘set up civil 
inquisition, and give power to the civil magistrate both of civil judgement and punishment in 
causes ecclesiastical’. Rulers who did this were not exercising any legitimate spiritual or 
political function, and were rather ‘tyrants’ and ‘persecutors’. [123] In short, the precepts of 
scripture were employed to enhance the power of earthly rulers, who then employed this 
power to persecute those who deviated from an officially determined pattern of religion. 
In his early writings on religion, Milton offered a number of sharp criticisms of the 
dominance of custom and history as the principal justifications for a particular pattern of 
ecclesiology. [124] For example, in Of Reformation, he condemned the reliance on the ‘fraud 
of deceivable traditions’ pedalled by ‘antiquaries’ who held bishops in the same esteem as 
‘old coins’; clerical power rested on a ‘Jewish beggary, of old cast rudiments’, rather than on 
any plausible interpretation of scripture. [125] In the Treatise on Civil Power, the attack on 
custom was aimed squarely at the central tenet of the Erastian understanding of church and 
state – the elision of the Jewish commonwealth and church: 
they pleasd receive answer from God, and had a commonwealth by him deliverd them, 
incorporated with a national church exercis'd more in bodily than in spiritual worship, so as 
that the church might be calld a commonwealth and the whole commonwealth a church: 
nothing of which can be said of Christianitie, deliverd without the help of magistrates, yea in 
the midst of thir opposition. [126] 
Here, Milton denies any continuity between the customs and practices of the Hebrews and 
those of the early Christians, themselves persecuted rather than aided by magistrates. At this 
point in the text he declares himself ‘against Erastus and state-tyranie over the church’, and 
argues that there was no ‘reason of state’ which justified the supremacy of the civil power 
over religion. [127] Where the Erastian position derived the confluence of church and state 
from the Hebraic model, Milton maintained that ‘Christ hath a government of his own, 
sufficient of it self to all his ends and purposes in governing his church’; most importantly, 
these ‘ends and purposes’ were not the same as those of the civil magistrate. [128] 
Milton refined this aspect of his argument in the course of a discussion of conscience. Like 
John Clark, he argued that religion was concerned with the ‘inward man and his actions’, 
which could not be coerced by an ‘outward force’. True religion was therefore not carnal and 
rooted in the body, but rather in the ‘will’ and ‘understanding’, which were the ‘faculties 
endu'd with freedom’. [129] The only legitimate influence upon these faculties comes from 
what Milton describes as ‘evangelic religion’, a term he illustrates by glossing 2 Corinthians 
X:3–5 (‘though we walk in the flesh, we do not warre after the flesh’) in order to establish the 
point that spiritual power within the church is sufficient to ‘reach the conscience and the 
inward man with whom it chiefly deals’. [130] Milton contrasts the moderation of this 
evangelic religion with the ‘boisterous tools’ employed by churchmen, who call ‘on the civil 
magistrate to interpose his fleshlie force’ in cases of heresy and schism. This elevation of 
magisterial power, in turn, gave rise to the conceit that the church had no being or legitimacy 
unless it ‘be enacted or settled, as they call it, by the state, a statute or a state-religion’. In 
fact, the state is constrained in its oversight of religion, and can ‘only recommend or 
propound it to our free and conscientious examination’. To do otherwise is to ‘set the state 
higher than the church in religion’. [131] Rounding out the argument, Milton suggests that 
the pattern of ecclesiology that elevates magisterial power rests on a defunct scriptural 
pattern, and he observes that ‘the state of religion under the gospel is far differing from what 
it was under the law’ – by which he means the Old Testament. [132] This law was defined by 
‘bondage’, while the gospel was characterized by ‘freedom’, and ‘If church and state shall be 
made one flesh again as under the law, let it be withal considerd, that God who then joined 
them hath now severed them’. [133] In other words, Hebrew precepts were examples of 
‘transient’ law and were not binding because they were supplanted by the new law. [134] 
The final segment of Milton's text was devoted to the articulation and defence of a concept of 
Christian liberty. [135] Once again, he emphasized the distinction between the punitive law 
of the Old Testament and the innate freedom of the gospel, ‘which sets us free not only from 
the bondage of those ceremonies but also the forcible imposition of those circumstances’ 
which applied under the ‘old law’. [136] The new ‘evangelic’ law includes specific 
injunctions in defence of liberty: ‘you are called to libertie’ (Galatians V:13); ‘be not made 
the servants of men’ (1 Corinthians VII: 23); ‘do not be entangled in a yoke of bondage’ 
(Galatians V:1). [137] Given that liberty is something that is codified by the new law, any 
attempt to impose discipline backed up by magisterial or clerical power ‘brings back into 
religion that law of terror and satisfaction, belonging now only to civil crimes’. Milton even 
goes so far as to elide Christian liberty with concepts that were central to the kind of liberty 
conveyed by the English common law, arguing that magistrates should not ‘meddle’ with 
‘Christian liberty, the birthright and outward testimonie’ of those ‘who are freeborne of the 
spirit’. [138] The ‘birthright’ to which Milton refers is the status of membership in the 
Christian societas, and the ‘sacred libertie’ that comes with membership in the body of the 
church. This liberty, in turn, is the basis of religious freedom, whereby conformity is ‘not to 
be driven in by edicts and force of arms’. Instead, the ‘settlement of religion belongs only to 
each particular church by perswasive and spiritual means within it self’, from which it 
follows that ‘there can be no place then left for the magistrate or his force in the settlement of 
religion’. [139] 
If we recall that Milton began his Treatise by calling on parliament both to ‘defend’ and 
‘enlarge’ Christian liberty, we recognize that the text itself is less about the intrinsic nature of 
civil power than it is about the defence of a form of civil religion. [140] As he argued in 
1642, ‘piety and justice’ were the foundations of political society, and they remained so 
regardless of what form of government that society possessed. Milton's rejection of the 
Erastian position is based on the view that the supremacy of the state over religion leads to 
the suppression of liberty, rather than its defence. And so the assumption that guides his 
exhortation to parliament is that the state defends and enlarges Christian liberty by not 
seeking to bring the church under the jurisdiction of the civil power. In short, the liberty of 
the church is an aggregate of the liberty and sovereignty of the individual conscience, and the 
freedom of one depends on the freedom of the other. 
Taken together, these texts suggest that our use of the term ‘Erastian’ to characterize 
discussions of church and state does not reveal the whole picture. Each was intended as an 
intervention at a particular juncture where the question of civil power over religion came 
under intense scrutiny, and this point alerts us to the fact that the problem of religious politics 
in England (and its colonies) cropped up in a range of debates on sovereignty, toleration and 
liberty of conscience. In each case, the writers examined here dealt with common themes, yet 
they arrived at very different conclusions. For example, Du Moulin argued that political logic 
demanded the supremacy of a sovereign civil power over the clergy, and even over the 
conscience of the ‘inward man’. Cobbet argued that religion was a ‘ligament’ of the state, but 
employed this argument in a way that placed an obligation on civil magistrates to defend one 
particular Protestant denomination; in this formulation, rather than being ‘neutral’, the civil 
power served the ‘purer churches’ while constraining the bodies and consciences of heretics, 
and did so as part of a duty imposed by scripture. Finally, we find Milton rejecting reason of 
state on the grounds that kingship and clerisy were both manifestations of tradition and 
custom. Religion was immune from civil power because it was governed by the evangelic 
law, which also guaranteed the liberty of individual conscience. 
While ‘Erastianism’ might be defended as a useful shorthand term, it is also the case that it 
has been asked to bear a very large interpretative burden – employed to characterize the 
political dynamic of the English revolution and its place in the larger story of the emergence 
of the ‘modern’ and religiously neutral state. This article has sought to sound a note of 
caution, arguing that we should avoid the uncritical assumption that there is a single 
explanation and terminological language that characterizes the nature of religious politics in 
seventeenth-century England. First, the texts that have been examined reveal that 
contemporaries approached the topic of civil power over religion by appealing to a range of 
texts and concepts; even in the case of the scriptures, we find contrasting views on the 
continuity between the Old and New Testaments, and the extent to which the scripture alone 
could be employed as a source of precept. The occasional rejection of the Hebraic example 
that was the bedrock of Erastus's own position is particularly striking. Second, while the 
article has focused somewhat narrowly on a selection of texts which appeared in the span of a 
single decade, it is also the case that each of these texts (written by and dedicated to 
prominent actors in the politics of the period) offers important insights into how 
contemporaries sought to come to grips with one major feature of the revolutionary period: 
re-fashioning the state. In this sense, religion remained central to the identity of politics, even 
in the case of Milton who explicitly rejected a ‘conformation’ between them. To describe this 
process as being dominated by Erastianism levels out a contemporary debate that was far 
more nuanced and complex. 
A possible way forward may lie in a concept that has appeared at points in this article – civil 
religion. [141] In work by Hobbes and Harrington, this goes beyond mere anti-clericalism 
and takes the form of a reasoned exploration of how the ends of politics are (or are not) 
compatible with the ends of religion, and the institutional framework within which this 
compatibility might be achieved. [142] Indeed, this was a durable theme in English 
ecclesiology and its rich polemical literature. [143] For example, Richard Hooker wrote that 
religion was the ‘stay’ of all ‘wel-ordered commonwealths’, and a necessary element of 
political and social stability. [144] Others noted that the fortunes of the commonwealth and 
church were intimately bound together, like ‘Hippocrates twins’. [145] That assumption 
continued to shape the process of reconciling the relation between church and state in a polity 
where the constitutional order included a form of established religion, howsoever its 
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